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stagnation during the l970s, the estate subsector grew
rapidly. The two subsectors are officially delineated in
terms of farm size, but a distinction between the two
subsectors on the basis of crops produced can also be
made. The estate subsector accounts for over 70 per
cent of Malawi's agricultural exports, mainly in the
form of tobacco (burley and flue cured), tea, sugar and
coffee. The main crops grown in the smallholder
subsector are maize, sorghum, cassava, pulses, rice,
cotton, groundnuts, and fire cured and sun aired
tobaccos. Thus the growth of the estate sector was
based on exploitation of export market demand,
together with the government's own supply side
efforts to promote estate production, which have been
well documented [Kydd 1984]. During the 1970s the
marketings of flue cured and burley tobaccos
increased at an average annual rate of 10 per cent and
17 per cent respectively. The production of tea and
sugar showed a similar growth pattern, averaging
6 per cent and 18 per cent per annum respectively.
Smallholder participation in the production of these
crops has been negligible.
Reasons for the Crop Dichotomy
The strategy pursued by the World Bank, together
with the particular economic and agricultural
characteristics of high value export crops have been
the major determinants of the limited involvement of
smallholders in the production of these crops in
Malawi. The World Bank has conceptualised and
encouraged a functiional dichotomy for the two
subsectors. The Bank's work in the late 1960s and
throughout the l970s gave a specific but comple-
mentary role in the growth process to each subsector:
As regards the future role of estates and
smallholders, agricultural production in Malawi
will continue to derive from two subsectors
coexisting and essentially playing complementary
roles. The smallholder subsector will continue to
assume the task of feeding the country's growing
population, in addition it should be expanding
export production of cash crops because it would
be feasible to maintain self sufficiency with less
resources as farmers adopt improved technology
under the NRDP. The estate subsector will have the
prime responsibility for generating agricultural
exports [World Bank 1981].
Introduction
In contrast to the work of Kydd [see for example,
Kydd 1985] this article is a case study of the
consequences for equity and growth in the Malawian
economy of the concentration of official policy
initiatives within the smallholder sub-sector on
'Integrated Rural Development Projects'. It examines
the value of an alternative strategy which would
continue to rely on the estate sector as a 'leading
sector' in export crop development, but which would
incorporate the smallholder production of high value
export crops. It shows that the prerequisites for
smaliholder development of these crops are different
from those for the traditionally produced smallholder
crops serviced through the National Rural Develop-
ment Programme. Except for those farming within the
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)
'Crop Authority' projects, smallholders are presently
precluded from the production of these crops. This is a
result of the World Bank's particular model of rural
development, in combination with the prerequisites
for smaliholder production of the crops. The
development of the alternative strategy would require
a rationalisation of the Bank's rural development
programme, as well as of the present model of CDC's
'smallholder authority'. The article therefore has
implications both for Malawi's rural development
strategy, which has recently been the subject of much
discussion; and for aid to the export sector, which,
particularly through CDC, has been the most
important element in British aid to agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa.
The Structure of the Agricultural Sector
The detail of Malawi's bimodal agricultural sector and
the growth record of the two subsectors have been set
out by Kydd elsewhere in this Bulletin. Certain aspects
of this bimodality are central to this article and will be
reiterated in a summarised form. It is estimated by the
World Bank that real growth in the Malawian
agricultural sector reached an average annual rate of
3.5 per cent during the 1970s. This was, however, the
aggregate result of markedly different levels of growth
in production in the two subsectors. Whilst the
smallholder subsector presents a picture of near
Agricultural policy towards the two subsectors has
developed in line with this conceptualisation. The
Bank has perceived the two subsectors as requiring
different degrees of intervention, and saw the estates
as an efficient subsector that should be left in private
hands. The orientation of the Bank towards the free
market and towards a 'basic needs' focus for its own
investments at a time of rapid growth of the estate
subsector led it virtually to ignore the estates for
investment purposes as well as in its analysis. Indeed,
the Malawi Government's request for the Bank to
fund an agricultural credit bank for both subsectors
was turned down because the Bank suspected that it
would be used primarily as a vehicle for financing
estate agriculture. A review of Bank literature on
Malawi during the 1970s reveals very little analysis of
estate/smallholder interactions.
The donors and official central government institutions
concentrated their resources on the development of
the smallholder subsector. The World Bank's initial
investment in smaliholder agriculture in Malawi was
in Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDP),
which dominated World Bank lending to Malawi from
1968-80. Given the size of these investments in relation
to the government's total agricultural development
spending (about 2/3 of the total in the mid- 1970s) they
necessarily had a heavy influence on the nature of
government intervention to promote smaliholder
development and the allocation of the government's
own financial and manpower resources. Three major
projects fall into the IRDP category: Lilongwe Land
Development and Shire Valley projects, approved by
the Bank in 1967 and 1968 respectively; and the
Karonga Rural Development project approved in
1972. The projects were largely focused on food crops
(although they contained traditional smallholder cash
crop components such as groundnuts, rice and
cotton). The technical basis of the projects was
directed towards increased production of traditional
smallholder crops. Early project documents continually
argued that the services required to transform the
smallholder subsector were:
the provision of basic infrastructure, such as rural
roads, input stores and produce markets, health
facilities, boreholes and housing and office
accommodation;
land improvements: land consolidation, irrigation
development and conservation works;
strengthening of extension, marketing, research
and public health staffing;
establishment of credit facilities for agricultural
inputs such as fertiliser, seeds, insecticides, work oxen
and farm implements.
The level and nature of infrastructure, the organisation
and intensity of credit and extension facilities,
marketing arrangements and the type of inputs
procured were directed towards traditional small-
holder crops, i.e. crops already being grown within the
smaliholder subsector, in line with the World Bank's
thinking. In practice the IRDP failed to meet their
productivity goals and were replaced by the National
Rural Development Programme in 1978. The NRDP
had as its basic goal the rapid increase in smallholder
production via nationwide application of the same set
of measures that were central to the IRDP, albeit with
a theoretically less infrastructural base. Thus to the
extent that there were changes between the IRDP and
the NRDP, these were related to the balance between
components, and were not a rationalisation of the
technical basis of smallholder development. The
NRDP remained directed towards traditional small-
holder crops.
A distinction can be drawn between the characteristics
of the traditional smallholder crops serviced by the
NRDP and specialised high value export crops such as
sugar, coffee, tea and flue cured tobacco. Specialised
high value export crops have the following charac-
teristics which distinguish them from the more
traditional crops:
they are subject to economies of scale from a
national viewpoint (although perhaps not from the
point of view of the individual producer). These
economies occur because of the decentralised and
duplicated services that must be provided to
smallholders;
most have a long lead time to maturity, although
they are not necessarily perennial;
they have a large processing and general capital
outlay requirement;
often processing must be carried out quickly after
harvest, with the harvest itself being required to
coincide with available processing or marketing
capacity;
y) large levels of working capital are required for their
production;
many are agriculturally complex, requiring the
timely operation of a wide range of technical
husbandry activities. Flue cured tobacco provides a
good example, particularly in nursery development
and curing activities;
they are marketed internationally;
as a result of i-vii above, these crops are
managerially complex.
Given the above characteristics of specialised high
value export crops it is clear that the services provided
under the national smaliholder development pro-
gramme precluded the participation ofsmallholders in
the production of these crops. It is not possible for
smallholders to produce high value export crops
independently within the NRDP in Malawi as it is
presently structured. The processing, transport and
67
marketing infrastructure does not exist, leaving
smallholders without the necessary inputs and
markets. Specialised and intensive extension advice
and credit in the correct forms are not available, and
smallholders do not have the management capacity
required for the efficient production of these crops.
The nature of donor interventions has 'fixed'
smaliholders into the production of traditional low
value smaliholder crops. The only smallholders
producing coffee, tea, sugar and flue cured tobacco
commercially in Malawi are doing so under the
auspices of Commonwealth Development Corporation
Smallholder Authorities. I return to look at these
schemes in a later section, after discussing the effects
on growth and equity of the 'crop fixing' nature of
current donor initiated agricultural projects in
Malawi.
4. The Consequences of the Crop Dichotomy
for Equity and Growth
I would argue that the pusuit of equitable agricultural
development in Malawi by the World Bank via the
concentration of investment and analysis on the
smaliholder sector has been misplaced. First, such a
strategy led the Bank to pay too little attention to
interactions between the estate sector and the
smallholder sector, as set out by Kydd, which resulted
in the transfer of resources from the smallholder sector
to the estate sector. Secondly, by conceptualising and
promoting a bimodal agrarian structure Malawian
smallholders have been prevented from participating
in the production of high value export crops which
offered relatively high net profits. A strategy which
promoted smaliholder participation in the rapid
increases in production of these crops over the last
15 years would have been more equitable.
In terms of growth, the Malawian government's
promotion of rapid estate development was, I believe,
not misplaced. Since independence Malawi's growth
record has been impressive by African standards. Real
income per capita grew at an average rate of 3.6 per cent
overtheperiod 1973-79. Between 1967 and l979gross
investment grew at an average rate of 22 per cent per
annum, with savings rising even faster than investment
over the same period. Export volumes grew at an
average rate of 6.4 per cent over the period 1964-79. It
is unlikely that Malawi would have achieved these
growth rates, had it relied on the expansion of the
smallholder subsector. The policy error was not
introducing smallholders to these crops once the estate
subsector had established production.
Smallholder participation in the production of high
value export crops could have made a further
contribution to long run growth. This is a direct result
of the fact that estate expansion has been limited by
land availability. Further growth in production can
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only come from estate intensification and the
development of smallholder production. In addition,
specialised high value export crops have characteristics
which make them important from the point of view of
growth linkages. These crops have strong growth
linkages. Much of the processing equipment and
buildings could be produced locally, for example
pruning knives, pulpery equipment, curing barns,
flues etc. Estates have tended to rely on over-
sophisticated and mechanised processing and har-
vesting equipment which has to be imported. On the
consumption side, the generation of income to many
smaliholders creates a demand for local goods and
services, in contrast to the import intensive demand
patterns of estate producers. Further growth linkages
occur from these crops because their resource
requirements are not matched with smallholder
resource endowments. Growth linkages are less likely
to occur where these are matched. A degree of
mismatching forces, for example, the development of
management skills by smaliholders and the adoption
of more sophisticated technologies. These linkages are
generally not taken into account in assessing a
project's economic worth, and in some senses the idea
of an economic rate of return becomes a static
concept. Economic rates of return say little about the
achievement of structural transformation goals. Cash
crops can promote economic transformation if their
production is planned in order to achieve this: They do
not necessarily fix economies into a certain 'mould' -
such fixing being more likely to occur if cash crops are
not promoted.
5. Promoting Smaliholder Production of
Specialised High Value Export Crops
Attempts to promote the smallholder production of
these crops in Malawi are confined to schemes
established by CDC. Under these schemes, small-
holders produce the crops either as outgrowers on
nucleus estates or through the extension of the crops to
existing smallholder communities. Other than the
connection to an estate development, both types of
scheme bear similarities in terms of operational and
financial structure. CDC have specialised in extending
these crops to smallholders and have developed their
own 'crop authority' model to provide the necessary
inputs in order to allow the smallholder to overcome
the constraints presented by their particular agri-
cultural and economic characteristics. This has
generally involved the provision of capital for the
development of scheme infrastructure, processing
capacity and working capital, along with technical and
managerial support to provide the timely supply of
inputs and production services (such as field
preparation) extension and crop marketing.
CDC have four schemes in Malawi. These are the
Smaliholder Sugar, Tea, Coffee and Flue Cured
Tobacco Authorities. Whilst these schemes have made
some contribution to development in Malawi - they
have extended the remunerative income generating
opportunities accruing from the production of these
crops to a larger proportion of the community, they
have created employment and generated foreign
exchange, the government has received a flow of tax
and levy revenues, social infrastructure has been
developed and senior field staff and managers have
been trained - the projects have been largely
unsuccessful in achieving their basic goals of
generating a reasonable income for smallholders and
being financially self supporting at maturity.
The major problems of the CDC model arise as a
result of the following factors:
the operational and financial structure of the
projects in combination with world market price
instability. In poor price years farmers are unable to
repay the scheme for services carried out on their
behalf. In the absence of other income generating
activities the scheme develops financial difficulties and
farmers build up debts;
the autonomous nature of the projects, which
increases overhead costs through duplication of
services. All operate outside of the NRDP;
inappropriate technology which again increases
overhead costs;
a non-farming systems approach to the development
of the special crop. This has led to low yields which are
insufficient to generate a net income, especially
because of high overhead costs. Services are provided
for the special crop only, and because the schemes are
independent of the NRDP this causes problems of
access to resources for other crops within the farming
system;
y) too little attention to food crop requirements
related to iv) above.
These factors are relevant to both nucleus estates and
to projects extending crops to farmers on their own
land, and can be illustrated with reference to the four
Malawi projects. The structure of the projects is
similar. All provide crop husbandry and management
services to the smallholder. In the case of KFCTA and
SSA the costs of these services are deducted from the
smallholder's gross returns, to arrive at a net income
for smaliholders. In the case of SCA and STA the
authorities pay the smallholder a guaranteed price and
rely on the margin between his producer price and the
world market price to cover their costs. All projects
have failed to generate adequate incomes for
smallholders both in terms of consistency and
magnitude. Where smallholders' net incomes are the
residual i.e. at KFCTA and SSA, in poor price years
the average smaliholder has often made a loss. At
KFCTA in the crop years 1978/79, 1979/80 and
1980/8 1 the average farmer made a loss on his tobacco
operations. Although the situation returned to
average profitability later, this still disguised the fact
that large tiumbers of farmers remained loss makers
(25 per cent in 198 1/82). At SSA the average farmer
made net losses in the 1983/84 and 1984/85 seasons.
Where the authority relies on a margin between the
producer price and the world price to cover costs,
producer prices are held at low levels. At STA poor
world prices led to the cessation of further tea
plantings in 1980/8 1 and the stagnation of producer
prices in real terms. All the projects except for SCA
have suffered from either stagnation or contraction in
terms of the numbers of farmers participating in the
projects.
The projects are centred on one cash crop. When the
world price is low farmers either make losses and are
unable to repay the authority for services it has
provided, or the margin between the producer price
and world price is squeezed. The projects develop
financial problems. In this way all the projects in
Malawi have required deficit financing. This problem
is exacerbated because the reduced incentives through
stagnating prices or farmer losses lead to further yield
reductions, increased farmer losses and further
financial problems for the project. At KFCTA in
1977/78 the fall in the price of tobacco was associated
with the formation of farmer debts and consequently a
downward spiral of yields began despite good crop
seasons in 1978/79 and 1979/80. The model has
proved problematic for small farmers in the face of
price instability, being based on a single cash crop and
fixed debt repayment terms.
The possibility of poor price years becomes more
important when accompanied by high production
costs. CDC scheme costs are high. The schemes are
characterised by costly central administration and
management systems. The autonomous nature of the
schemes means that they often duplicate services being
provided by other public or private institutions. Many
have their own extension services, transport and
building departments. STA has its own tea factory to
which green leaf is transported over large distances
despite spare capacity in nearby private factories.
Scheme technology is often inappropriate. Too little
use is made of low technology inputs and smaliholder
labour. Tractors have replaced bullock carts at
KFCTA and expensive leaf trailers are in use at STA
for example.
Within the projects, smallholder special crop
requirements take priority. A good example of this is
inputs, which are provided for the special crop alone.
Little attention is given to farmer priorities, the
allocation of farmer resources and the integration of
the special crops into the farming system. The result is
the diversion of fertilisers to food crops and competing
demands on farmer labour, thereby reducing crop
yields. A bias towards the finances of the authority
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over the economics of the smaliholder leads to poor
pricing policy, which increases rather than solves
authority financial problems. Examples of the
'financial approach' are many, and range from the
dearth of economic data available at CDC and project
offices in comparison to financial data, to the
recommedations of an STA reappraisal mission where
lack of throughput had caused financial problems,
and freezing of smallholder prices was put forward to
overcome this. Financial problems often arise because
throughput is low (a result of the factors set out above)
although each unit of production does contribute to
project overheads. The accountants approach leads to
frozen producer prices as these are seen as the major
'cost', but frozen prices only reduce throughput
further. Financial considerations become particularly
important with nucleus estates, where the goal of
profitability of the estate is in conflict with the goal of
smaliholder income maximisation.
A model which passes the effects of price instability on
to small farmers and which emcompasses single cash
cropping and results in low yields and high overhead
costs is not satisfactory for the successful production
of specialised high value export crops by smaliholders.
Inappropriate technology and low incomes further
prevent smallholder participation from contributing
the potential equity and growth benefits set out earlier.
Fixed debt repayment terms on CDC loans mean that
it is smaliholder incomes that must 'give' in poor price
years. Further thought must be given to automatic
rescheduling of loans by CDC when the world price
falls more than a given percentage from its five year
moving average. Loan terms are at present in conflict




Crops may be categorised in relation to their economic
and financial production characteristics. The charac-
teristics of high value export crops are in conflict with
the resource endowments of smallholders. The
National Rural Development Programme has not
been directed towards proving the resources necessary
if smallholders are to produce such crops. This has had
implications for equity and growth in the Malawian
economy, since the different crop categories have
different equity and growth potentials. Whilst CDC
has been instrumental in attempting to extend high
value export crops to smallholders, its particular
project model is fraught with problems which lead to
high production overheads and low yields, a
combination which generates neither adequate
incomes now financially self supporting projects.
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